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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between real exchange rate dynamics 
and financial market imperfections. For this purpose, we first construct a New 
Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) model that incorporates international 
staggered loan contracts as a simple form of the financial market imperfections. 
Recent empirical studies show that such staggered loan contracts are prevalent in 
the US, UK, and Japan and direct shocks to the bank lending interest rate (risk 
premium shocks) are major drivers of business cycle dynamics. Simulation results 
only with such a financial market friction and a risk premium shock can generate 
persistent, volatile, and realistic hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates, 
which have been thought very difficult to reproduce in standard NOEM models. 
This implies that these financial market developments can possibly be a major 
source of real exchange rate fluctuations. 
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 1 Introduction
Empirical studies conclude that real exchange rate dynamics are very volatile,
persistent, and hump-shaped against shocks.1 So far in international ￿nance,
it has been intensively argued whether theoretical dynamic general equilibrium
models can reproduce such realistic exchange rate dynamics. Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2002), focusing on the ￿rst two features, insist that the New Open
Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) models may account for the volatility but
not for the persistence. In response to this critique, several studies have at-
tempted to solve these three puzzles by introducing such features as strategic
complementarity, nonoptimizing monetary policy, and optimal monetary pol-
icy into otherwise standard NOEM models as in Bergin and Feenstra (2000),
Benigno (2004a), and Benigno (2004b). These newly introduced mechanisms
mitigate the persistence puzzle of the real exchange rate dynamics to some ex-
tent, but have not yet solved it completely. Actual persistence of real exchange
rates is still higher than that simulated in those models. Furthermore, they can-
not explain the signi￿cant hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates found
in actual data.
While the focus has been on the monetary shock in the above studies fol-
lowing Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), Steinsson (2007) ￿rst stresses the
importance of generating hump-shaped responses based on his autoregressive
estimation of real exchange rates2 and shows that realistic levels of volatility,
persistence, and hump-shaped responses of real exchange rates can be generated
with the NOEM models when the cost-push shock is added to the economy,
where the home bias is very strong. The resolution by Steinsson (2007) is sim-
ple but very powerful. Because the real exchange rate is determined as the ratio
1See, for example, Huizinga (1987), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Cheung and Lai
(2000).
2The importance of reproducing the hump-shaped responses are emphasized in, for exam-
ple, Chrsitiano and Vigfusson (2003) and Vigfusson (2007).
1of the marginal utility out of consumption in the home country over that in the
foreign country, the volatility and persistence of real exchange rates are muted
when a market is complete, as usually assumed in literatures in this ￿eld. By
setting the home bias parameter very high, the home shocks have only negli-
gible e⁄ects on foreign variables. Under such circumstances, the hump-shaped
responses of real exchange rates come from responses in consumptions and so
from real interest rates, because the consumption can be represented as the
discounted sum of future real interest rates according to the Euler conditions.
There, after a cost-push shock hits the economy, in￿ ation and consumption can
move in opposite directions while they comove to the monetary policy shock.
As a result, real interest rates a⁄ected naturally by short-term nominal interest
rates set through the Taylor (1993)-type rule show nonmonotonic responses.3
Therefore, we can reproduce the hump-shaped responses in real interest rates
and therefore in real exchange rates.
Although the explanation by Steinsson (2007) is neat and very clear, is this
the end of the conquest for the causes of real exchange rate dynamics? To this
question, we answer ￿not necessarily.￿The reasons are as follows. The empirical
part of Steinsson (2007) only demonstrates the estimation results of the autore-
gressive models of the real exchange rates. This implies that the cost-push
shock should be considered only as one possible source from numerous candi-
dates, which are important for realistic real exchange dynamics. Particularly,
recent empirical papers emphasize the role of a direct shock on the ￿nancial
market in explaining the actual business cycle tendencies found in the data. For
example, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) show that according to their
Bayesian estimation results of the dynamic general equilibrium model4 com-
bined with the ￿nancial accelerator model by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
3This logic is similar to Benigno (2004a).
4The model is based on Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
2(1999) and the banking system by Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995),
a direct shock on the net worth dynamics, namely a direct shock on the exter-
nal ￿nance premium, has been playing a very important role in US and Euro
area business cycles.5 Moreover, estimation results on microlevel ￿rm data by
Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek (2004) show that the external ￿nance premium
moves irrespective of the dynamics in leverages. These results suggest that the
premium is ￿ uctuating, not according to such a theory as the costly state ver-
i￿cation in Townsend (1979), but following the shock that a⁄ects the ￿nancial
market directly. In international ￿nance, several studies emphasize the impor-
tance of such an interest rate spread shock. Uribe and Yue (2006) demonstrate
through VAR analysis that country interest rate spread shocks explain about
12% of business cycles in emerging economies. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show
that country interest rate spread shocks explain 50% of output ￿ uctuations in
Argentina. Moreover, in international ￿nance, economic theories have not yet
fully explained long remaining di⁄erences between domestic and foreign interest
rates. There should be international risk premiums that still cannot be ex-
plained by theories. Therefore, we examine the case of a shock directly related
to the ￿nancial market; i.e., a risk premium shock.
To be able to investigate the role of such a direct shock in ￿nancial markets
on real exchange rate dynamics, we construct a model with an explicit role of
banks. In particular, we incorporate staggered (sticky) loan contracts examined
in Teranishi (2007) into an otherwise standard NOEM model. Many studies,
such as Goldfeld (1966), Slovin and Sushka (1983), Berger and Udell (1992),
Cowling (2007), and Teranishi (2007), provide empirical evidence on sticky loan
interest rate contracts in the US, UK, and Japan. This sticky loan contract
is one form of ￿nancial market imperfection. Financial market imperfection
5Smets and Wouters (2007) conclude that a risk premium shock has a substantial e⁄ect on
US output dynamics even though such a risk premium shock is assumed to a⁄ect the consumer
side through asset holdings rather than the ￿rm side in their model.
3implies the existence of a wedge between the optimal levels and the actual
levels of loan interest rates. For instance, in the ￿nancial accelerator model,
this wedge is determined by the time-varying leverage. However, in our model
with staggered loan contracts, the wedge is determined by the Calvo (1983)
parameter as in the case with a staggered price setting. We can apply direct
shocks to this model related to ￿nancial market imperfections such as the cost-
push shock in the standard New Keynesian models.
The contribution of this paper is that we investigate the relationship between
real exchange rate dynamics and ￿nancial market developments using a NOEM
model that incorporates international staggered loan contracts as a simple form
of the international ￿nancial market imperfections, and risk premium shocks as
a direct shock in the ￿nancial market. We show that staggered loan contracts
and risk premium shocks can generate persistent, volatile, and hump-shaped
responses in real exchange rates, which are considered very di¢ cult to repro-
duce in standard NOEM models. An outcome that such a risk premium shock
can actually generate volatile, persistent, and hump-shaped responses in real
exchange rates is very intriguing. A risk premium shock itself is not a cost-push
shock but is considered to be a more microfounded cost-push shock. We assume
working capital loans, namely, that ￿rms must borrow from banks in advance of
production to pay wage bills, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
Under such circumstances, loan payments and wages become the components
of the marginal costs. As a result, a direct shock to loan interest rates works
as if it were a cost-push shock and therefore results in hump-shaped responses
in the real exchange rate by a mechanism similar to that explained in Steins-
son (2007). Moreover, in contrast to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and
Steinsson (2007), we show that only with ￿nancial market developments such
as a staggered loan contract and a risk premium shock can we reproduce real-
4Figure 1: Agents in the model
istic exchange rate dynamics. This means that in a model with international
staggered loan contracts, price stickiness is not necessary for replicating real-
istic exchange rate dynamics. Therefore, staggered loan contracts and a risk
premium shock is possibly a major source of real exchange rate ￿ uctuations.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we derive a model
under international staggered loan contracts. Then, Section 3 shows that realis-
tic responses of real exchange rates are reproduced in such a model. Finally, in
Section 4, we summarize our ￿ndings in this paper and discuss future extensions.
2 Model
The model consists of two symmetric countries. There are four types of agent in
each country, consumers, ￿rms, private banks, and the central bank, as depicted
in Figure 1.
52.1 Consumer
A representative consumer plays four roles: (1) to consume di⁄erentiated goods
determined through two-step cost minimization problems on both home- and
foreign-produced consumer goods; (2) to choose the amount of aggregate con-
sumption, bank deposits, and investment in risky assets given a deposit interest
rate set by the central bank; (3) with monopolistic power on labor supply, to
provide di⁄erentiated labor services which belong to either the domestically ￿-
nancially supported (DFS) or the internationally ￿nancially supported (IFS)
groups, and to o⁄er wages to those di⁄erentiated types of labor; and (4) to own
banks and ￿rms, and to receive dividends in each period. Role (3) is crucial role
in staggered loan contracts. Thanks to this di⁄erentiated labor supply, the de-
mand for loans is di⁄erentiated without assuming any restrictions on aggregate
loans and loan interest rates.6
2.1.1 Cost minimization
The utility of the representative consumer7 in the home country H is increasing
and concave in the aggregate consumption index Ct. The consumption index
that consists of bundles of di⁄erentiated goods produced by home and foreign









H (1 ￿ ￿H)
1￿￿H ;
where ￿H (0 ￿ ￿H ￿ 1) is a preference parameter that expresses the home bias.
Here, CH;t and CF;t are consumption subindices of the continuum of di⁄eren-
tiated goods produced by ￿rms in the home country and the foreign country,










6For details, see Teranishi (2007).
7The same optimal allocations are obtained even by assuming that each homogenous con-
sumer provides di⁄erentiated labor supply to each ￿rm.











where ct (f) is the demand for a good produced by ￿rm f in the home country
and ct (f￿) is the demand for a good produced by a ￿rm f￿ in the foreign
country, where the asterisk denotes foreign variables. It is assumed that there
are no trade frictions and consumers in both countries have the same preferences
over the di⁄erentiated goods. Following the standard cost minimization problem
on the aggregate consumption index of home and foreign goods as well as the
consumption subindices of the continuum of di⁄erentiated goods, we can derive
























where pt (f) is the price on ct (f), and pt (f￿) is the price on ct (f￿). Then, we
can obtain the following Hicksian demand functions for each di⁄erentiated good




















Here, as in other applications of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator, con-
sumers￿allocations across di⁄erentiated goods at each time are optimal in terms
of cost minimization.
7We can derive similar optimality conditions for the foreign counterpart. For










and the demand functions for each di⁄erentiated good given the aggregate con-
sumption are:
c￿

















































where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the state of nature at date
t. The budget constraint of the consumer is given by:9










where Bt is a risky asset, Dt is the deposit to private banks, it is the nominal
deposit interest rate set by a central bank from t ￿ 1 to t, wt(h) is the nominal
wage for labor supplied from the DFS lt(h), wt(h) is the nominal wage for




t￿1(h)dh is the nominal dividend





t￿1(f)df is the nominal dividend from the ownership of the
9For simplicity, we do not explicitly include the amount of contingency claims under com-
plete ￿nancial markets.
8￿rms in the domestic country, and Xt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor. Here,
because we assume a complete ￿nancial market between the two countries, the
consumer in each country can internationally buy and sell the state contingent
securities to insure against country speci￿c shocks. Consequently, there only
exists a unique discount factor. The relationship between the deposit interest
rate and the stochastic discount factor is now expressed as:
1
1 + it
= Et [Xt;t+1]: (6)
Given the optimal allocation of di⁄erentiated consumption expenditures, the
consumer now optimally chooses the total amount of consumption, risky assets,
and deposits in each period. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions, when the
transversality condition is satis￿ed, for those optimizations are given by:















Together with equation (6), we see that the condition given by equation (7)
de￿nes the intertemporally optimal allocation on aggregate consumption. Then,
the standard New Keynesian IS curve for the home country, by log-linearizing
equation (7) around steady states, is obtained as follows:
b Ct = Et b Ct+1 ￿ ￿
￿
b it ￿ Et￿t+1
￿
; (9)
where an aggregate in￿ ation in the home country ￿t ￿ ln Pt
Pt￿1 and ￿ ￿ ￿ UC
UCCC >
0. Each variable is de￿ned as the log deviation from its steady state value, where
the log-linearized version of variable xt is expressed by b xt = ln(xt=x), except
for ￿t, given that x is the steady state value of xt.
In this model, a representative consumer provides all types of di⁄erentiated
labor to each ￿rm, and therefore maintains some monopoly power over the
determination of his own wage, as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). There
9are two types of labor group: the DFS and the IFS. The workers populated on
[0;n) belong to the DFS and other labor populated on [n;1] belong to the IFS.10
We assume that each ￿rm hires all types of labor in the same proportion from
the two groups. The consumer sets each wage wt(h) for any h and wt(h) for any
h to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint given by equation (5)
and the labor demand functions given by equations (18) and (19) in the next
section. Here, although di⁄erentiated labor supply is assumed in this paper,
consumers change wages in a ￿ exible manner. Then we have the optimality


























As written above, thanks to this heterogeneity in labor supply, we can model the
di⁄erentiated demand for loans without assuming any restrictions on aggregate
loans and loan interest rates. In this paper, consumers supply their labor only
for ￿rms, not for banks.
Similar to the above case with cost minimization, we can derive the opti-
mality conditions for the foreign counterpart. For example, the standard New
Keynesian IS curve for the foreign country is:
b C￿
t = Et b C￿
t+1 ￿ ￿￿(b i￿
t ￿ Et￿￿
t+1); (12)
which is derived from the optimality condition on the foreign asset holdings:
U￿
C(C￿



























10The di⁄erence of these two groups is characterized by somewhat wider properties of work-
ers, like English speaking or Japanese speaking, though the di⁄erences of workers within each
group are characterized by narrower properties of workers, like person who has knowledge of
accounting in bank or person who has skill of making automobile in plant.



































There exists a continuum of ￿rms populated over unit mass [0;1] in each country.
Each ￿rm plays two roles. First, each ￿rm decides the amount of di⁄erentiated
labor to be employed from both the DFS and IFS groups, through the two-
step cost minimization problem on the production cost. Part of the costs of
labor must be ￿nanced by external loans from banks. For example, in country
H, to ￿nance the costs of hiring workers from the DFS, the ￿rm must borrow
from local banks in the home country. However, to ￿nance the costs of hiring
workers from the IFS, the ￿rm must borrow from international banks in the
foreign country. One reason of such a loan di⁄erence is that a ￿rm borrows
loans from both domestic and foreign banks, i.e. a bank lends loans to both
domestic and foreign ￿rms as shown in Gadanecz (2004). Another reason is
that we also know that ￿rms borrow many loans with di⁄erent loan interest
rates at the same time depending on properties of projects. We interpret that
these project di⁄erences are characterized by types of labor. Labor is immobile
between the two countries. Here, we assume that ￿rms must use all types of
labor and therefore borrow from both local and international banks in the same
proportion.11 Second, in a monopolistically competitive goods market, where
individual demand curves on di⁄erentiated consumption goods are o⁄ered by
consumers, each ￿rm sets a di⁄erentiated goods price for both home and foreign
countries to maximize its pro￿t. Prices are set in a staggered manner as in
11The same structure is assumed for employment in Woodford (2003).
11the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1996) framework under the pricing-to-market strategy
following Steinsson (2007). Under a pricing-to-market assumption, ￿rms set
di⁄erent prices on the same goods in di⁄erent countries.12
2.2.1 Cost minimization
Firms in both home and foreign countries optimally hire di⁄erentiated labor
as price takers. This optimal labor allocation is carried out through two-step
cost minimization problems. Domestic ￿rm f hires all types of labor from both
the DFS and IFS groups. When hiring from the DFS group, ￿ portion of the
labor cost associated with labor type h is ￿nanced by borrowing from the local
bank h. Then, the ￿rst-step cost minimization problem on the allocation of





[1 + ￿rt (h)]wt (h)lt(h;f)dh;














where rt(h) is the loan interest rate applied to employ a particular labor type
h applied to di⁄erentiated labor supply. There lt(h;f) denotes type of labor h
employed by ￿rm f. The local bank h has some monopoly power over setting
loan interest rates. Thus, we assume the monopolistic competition on the loan
contracts between banks and ￿rms. The relative demand on di⁄erentiated labor






















12For the theoretical rational behind pricing-to-market, see, for example, Krugman (1987)
and Devereux (1997).
12As a result, we can derive:
Z n
0
[1 + ￿rt (h)]wt (h)lt (h;f)dh = ￿tLt (f):
Through a similar cost minimization problem, we can derive the relative




























































dh = ￿tLt (f):
According to the above two optimality conditions, the ￿rms optimally choose
the allocation of di⁄erentiated workers between the two groups. Because ￿rms
have some preference n to hire workers from the DFS and (1 ￿ n) to hire work-
ers from the IFS, the second-step cost minimization problem describing the
allocation of di⁄erentiated labor between these two groups is given by:
min
Lt;Lt
￿tLt (f) + ￿tLt (f);
subject to the aggregate labor index:





nn (1 ￿ n)
1￿n :
Then, the relative demand functions for each di⁄erentiated type of labor are
derived as follows:

















13Therefore, we can obtain the following equations:
￿tLt (f) + ￿tLt (f) = e ￿te Lt (f);
lt (h;f) =
￿



























e Lt (f); (19)
from equations (14), (15), (16), and (17). We can now clearly see that the
demand for each di⁄erentiated worker depends on wages and loan interest rates,
given the total demand for labor.
Finally, by the assumption that the ￿rms ￿nance part of the labor costs by
loans, we can derive:
qt (h;f) = ￿wt (h)lt (h;f)
= ￿wt (h)
￿












































denote amounts of loan borrowed by ￿rm f to the labor
types h and h, respectively. These conditions demonstrate that the demands
for each di⁄erentiated loan also depend on the wages and loan interest rates,
given the total labor demand.

























































































































































Furthermore, loan demand conditions are:
q￿
t (h￿;f￿) = ￿￿w￿
t (h￿)l￿














































































152.2.2 Price setting (pro￿t maximization)
As is standard in the New Keynesian model following the Calvo (1983) - Yun
(1996) framework, each ￿rm f resets its price with probability (1 ￿ ￿) and






pt (f)ct;T (f) + STp￿
t (f)c￿
t;T (f) ￿ e ￿T e LT (f)
i
; (20)
where we use equations (2) and (4) for any time t. Here, the ￿rm sets pt (f)
and p￿
t (f) separately under the pricing-to-market assumption. There St is the
nominal exchange rate. The present discounted value of the pro￿t given by






































It should be noted that price setting is independent of the loan interest rate
setting of private banks.
The optimal price setting of pt (f) under the situation in which managers
















where we substitute equation (8). By further substituting equations (10) and



















































































16By log-linearizing equation (22), we derive:
1
1 ￿ ￿￿








￿H;￿ + ￿1 b RH;T + ￿2 b R￿




where ￿1 ￿ n
￿(1+RH)







are positive parameters, and
we de￿ne the real marginal cost as:
c mcH;t;T (f) ￿
Z n
0































































where RH;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by local banks in the home country,
R￿
H;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by international banks in the home
country, and ￿H;t is in￿ ation of goods produced and consumed in the home
country. Then, equation (23) can be transformed into:
1
1 ￿ ￿￿



















where we make use of the relationship:
c mcH;t;T (f) = c mcH;T ￿ ￿2￿
"






17where ￿2 ￿ ￿
f
￿1
Y Y(Y H)Y H
f
￿1







































The point is that unit marginal cost is the same for all ￿rms in the situation
where each ￿rm uses all types of labor and loans with the same proportion.
Thus, all ￿rms set the same price if they have a chance to reset their prices at
time t.
In the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1996) setting, the evolution of the aggregate price



































The current aggregate price is given by the weighted average of changed and
unchanged prices. Because the chances of resetting prices are randomly assigned
to each ￿rm with equal probability, an aggregate price change at time t should
be evaluated by an average of price changes by all ￿rms. By log-linearizing








18where the slope coe¢ cient ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1+￿2￿) is a positive parameter. This is
quite similar to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, but contains loan
interest rates as cost components.
Similarly, regarding the optimal price setting of p￿






H;t + ￿1 b RH;t + ￿2 b R￿






H;t is given by replacing P by P￿ in c mcH;t. ￿￿
H;t is in￿ ation of goods
produced in the home country and consumed in the foreign country.
Furthermore, from optimal price settings by ￿rm f￿ in the foreign country,















c mcF;t + ￿￿
1 b R￿
F;t + ￿￿


























Y Y(Y F)Y F
f
￿1
Y (Y F) . RF;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by inter-
national banks in the foreign country, R￿
F;t is the aggregate loan interest rate
by local banks in the foreign country, ￿￿
F;t is in￿ ation of goods produced and
consumed in the foreign country, and ￿F;t is in￿ ation of goods produced in the
foreign country and consumed in the home country.
As for CPI in￿ ation rates, from equations (1) and (3), we can derive the
following log-linearized relations as:
￿t = ￿H￿H;t + (1 ￿ ￿H)￿F;t;
and
￿￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿H)￿￿
H;t + ￿H￿￿
F;t;
under the assumption of ￿H = 1￿￿F; namely, symmetric home bias. Then, by
considering the weighted average of equations (26) and (29) and the weighted
19average of equations (27) and (28), respectively, we can ￿nally obtain the fol-
lowing two New Keynesian Phillips curves for consumer prices:
￿t = ￿H￿
￿
￿1 b RH;t + ￿2 b R￿
H;t
￿















+ &qt + ￿Et￿t+1;
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t = (1 ￿ ￿H)￿
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l > 0, and:
b CWA





t = ￿F b Ct + (1 ￿ ￿F) b C￿
t : (33)
When deriving equations (30) and (31), we assume that marginal cost elasticities
of productions are zero, namely that the production function is linear,13 and
￿ = ￿￿ and ￿ = ￿￿, as will be demonstrated in Table 3. Furthermore, in this
transformation, we use the optimality conditions on bond holdings:
￿￿
t ￿ ￿t + 4b St = 4b qt; (34)
and
b Ct ￿ b C￿
t = ￿b qt: (35)






13￿2 = 0, ￿1 = 0, ￿￿
2 = 0, and ￿￿
1 = 0. If the marginal cost elasticity of production is
nonzero, the Phillips curves become more complicated. However, the qualitative outcomes of
simulations do not change even under a positive marginal cost elasticity of production.
20from its steady state value. Equation (35) is obtained from two Euler equations
in the domestic and foreign countries, namely, equations (8) and (13), under the
internationally complete ￿nancial market.14
2.3 Private banks
There exists a continuum of private banks populated over [0;1]. There are two
types of banks in each country; local banks populate over [0;n) and international
banks populate over [n;1]. Each private bank plays two roles: (1) to collect the
deposits from consumers in its country, and (2) under the monopolistically com-
petitive loan market, to set di⁄erentiated nominal loan interest rates according
to their individual loan demand curves, given the amount of their deposits. We
assume that each bank sets the di⁄erentiated nominal loan interest rate accord-
ing to the types of labor force as examined in Teranishi (2007). Staggered loan
contracts between ￿rms and private banks produce a situation in which the
private banks ￿x the loan interest rates for a certain period.
A local bank lends only to ￿rms when they hire labor from the DFS. However,
an international bank only provides a loan to ￿rms when they hire labor from
the IFS. The lending structure is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Lending structure
Local bank International bank
Home country for f to hire h for f￿ to hire h
￿
Foreign country for f￿ to hire h￿ for f to hire h
First, we describe the optimization problem of an international bank in the
home country. Here, the international bank takes on the exchange rate risk
inherent in its loans. Each international bank can reset loan interest rates with
probability (1 ￿ ’￿) following the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1996) framework. Under
14Following the convention, we assume Q0 = 0.
21the segmented environment stemming from di⁄erences in labor supply, private
banks can set di⁄erent loan interest rates depending on the types of labor. As a
consequence, the private bank holds some monopoly power over the loan interest
rate to ￿rms. Therefore, the international bank h
￿
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Because the international private banks that have the opportunity to reset their




in equation (36) is expressed only with rt. In this case, we have the following
evolution of the aggregate loan interest rate index by international banks in the
home country:
1 + RF;t = ’￿ (1 + RF;t￿1) + (1 ￿ ’￿)(1 + rt): (37)
By log-linearizing equations (36) and (37), we can determine the relationship
between the loan and deposit interest rate as follows:
b RF;t = ￿
￿
1Et b RF;t+1 + ￿
￿





























positive parameters. This equation describes the foreign country￿ s loan interest
rate (supply) curve by the international bank in the home country.
Similarly, from the optimization problem of a local bank h in the home
country, we can obtain the relationship between loan and deposit interest rates
as follows:











1+RH are positive pa-
rameters. This equation describes the home country￿ s loan interest rate (supply)
curve by the local bank in the home country.



































= (1 ￿ n)DT:
For international banks in the foreign country, we can derive the following
loan interest rate curve:
b R￿
H;t = ￿1Et b R￿
H;t+1 + ￿2 b R￿
H;t￿1 + ￿3
￿



















tive parameters. This equation describes the home country￿ s loan interest rate
(supply) curve by the international bank in the foreign country. Similarly, for






































positive parameters. This equation describes the foreign country￿ s loan interest
rate (supply) curve by the local bank in the foreign country. It should be noted
that the four types of private bank in both the home and foreign countries can
have di⁄erent probabilities for resetting their loan interest rates. The foreign


































dh = (1 ￿ n)D￿
T:
2.4 Central banks
To close the model, the central banks in both countries set the deposit interest
rates following the Taylor (1993)-type rules as:
b it = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿1￿t + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿2 b Ct + ￿ib it￿1; (42)
and
b i￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿￿
i)￿￿
1￿￿






where ￿1, ￿2, ￿￿
1, ￿￿
2, ￿i, and ￿￿
i are positive policy parameters.
2.5 System of equations
The linearized system of equations consist of 14 equations: (9), (12), (30), (31),
(32), (33), (34), (35), (38), (39), (40), (41), (42) and (43) for 14 endogenous
variables: b C, b C￿, ￿, ￿￿, b CWA, b CWA
￿
, b q, b S, b RF, b RH, b R￿
H, b R￿
F, b i, and b i￿. They
are summarized in Table 2 below.
3 Simulation Results
The parameters are calibrated in Table 3. ￿, ￿￿, ￿, ￿￿, ￿, ￿￿, ￿H, ￿1, ￿￿
1, ￿2,
￿￿
2, ￿i and ￿￿
i are from Steinsson (2007). ￿, ￿ and ￿￿ are from Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997). It should be noted that the elasticities of output with respect
to real interest rates are set to be low enough to match the relative volatilities
of the real exchange rates and consumption as in Steinsson (2007). Slovin and
Sushka (1983) claim that private banks, on average, need at least two quarters
24Table 2: System of equations
Eq. (9): b Ct =Et b Ct+1 ￿ ￿(b it￿Et￿t+1)
Eq. (12): b C￿
t =Et b C￿
t+1 ￿ ￿￿(b i￿
t￿Et￿￿
t+1)
Eq. (30): ￿t = ￿H￿(￿1 b RH;t + ￿2 b R￿





t + (1 ￿ ￿H)b CWA
￿
t ) + &qt + ￿Et￿t+1
Eq. (31): ￿￿






t + (1 ￿ ￿F)b CWA
￿
t ) ￿ &￿qt + ￿Et￿￿
t+1
Eq. (32): b CWA
t = ￿H b Ct + (1 ￿ ￿H)b C￿
t
Eq. (33): b CWA
￿
t = ￿F b Ct + (1 ￿ ￿F)b C￿
t
Eq. (34): ￿￿
t ￿ ￿t + 4b St = 4b qt
Eq. (35): b Ct ￿ b C￿
t = ￿b qt
Eq. (38): b RF;t = ￿
￿
1Et b RF;t+1 + ￿
￿
2 b RF;t￿1 + ￿
￿
3(b it￿Et4b St+1)
Eq. (39): b RH;t = ￿1Et b RH;t+1 + ￿2 b RH;t￿1 + ￿3b it
Eq. (40): b R￿
H;t = ￿1Et b R￿
H;t+1 + ￿2 b R￿
H;t￿1 + ￿3(Et4b St+1 +b i￿
t)











Eq. (42): b it = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿1￿t + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿2 b Ct + ￿ib it￿1
Eq. (43): b i￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿￿
i)￿￿
1￿￿






and perhaps more to adjust loan interest rates. Thus, the average contract
duration of loan interest rates is set to be three quarters which is the average
price duration in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). We assume that the ratio
of the dependency on external ￿nance is unity and preferences regarding labor
supply are the same between the DFS and IFS groups.
We impose two types of shock on the model. They are the risk premium and
the cost-push shocks. The risk premium shock is a shock directly given to the
loan interest rate curve as in equation (38), so this shock can be interpreted as a
time-varying exogenous international risk premium on loan interest rates from
the home country to the foreign country. More precisely, such a situation can
be depicted when, for example, international banks maximize pro￿t considering















where Mt is an exogenous risk factor that international banks face. Then, we
25Table 3: Parameter values
Parameters Values Explanation
￿ 0.99 Discount factor
￿;￿￿ 0.2 Elasticity of output with respect to real interest rate
￿;￿￿ 0.43 Elasticity of in￿ ation with respect to output
￿;￿￿ 0.75 Probability of price change
’;’￿;’;’￿ 0.66 Probability of loan interest rate change
￿ 7.66 Substitutability of di⁄erentiated consumption goods
￿;￿￿ 7.66 Substitutability of di⁄erentiated laborers
￿;￿￿;￿;￿￿ 1 Ratio of external ￿nance to total ￿nance
n 0.5 Preference for laborers in the DFS
￿H 0.94 Preference for goods produced in the home country
￿1;￿￿
1 2 Coe¢ cient on in￿ ation rate in the Taylor rule
￿2;￿￿
2 0.5 Coe¢ cient on the output gap in the Taylor rule
￿i;￿￿
i 0.85 Lag parameter in the Taylor rule
can derive a loan interest rate curve with a disturbance mt as a risk premium:
b RF;t = ￿
￿
1Et b RF;t+1 + ￿
￿
2 b RF;t￿1 + ￿
￿
3(b it ￿ Et4b St+1) + mt;
where mt = ￿lnMt. Recent studies, such as Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and
Uribe and Yue (2006), insist that international risk premium shocks can induce
large business cycles. Moreover, Marston (1995) and Uribe and Yue (2006) state
that interest rate spreads are quite persistent. Marston (1995) demonstrates
that interest rate di⁄erences among countries are quite persistent while Uribe
and Yue (2006) conclude that dynamics in country spreads show enough persis-
tence in South American emerging countries by employing VAR analysis. Pages
(1999) shows that term spreads of LIBOR from one- to 12-month maturities
demonstrate strong persistence, which implies the persistence of risk premium
shocks. This is the reason why we employ a very persistent risk premium with
an AR(1) parameter of 0.9. We can express such a shock as:
mt = 0:9mt￿1 + ￿t;
where ￿t is an i.i.d shock process. As for the cost-push shock dynamics, we
set the same persistence for goods produced by the home country as Steinsson
26(2007).
Table 4 shows the detailed simulation outcomes of the real exchange rate
dynamics. We report ￿ve statistics for real exchange rates: (1) UL (up-life),
(2) UL/HL (up-life over half-life), (3) QL-HL (quarter-life minus half-life), (4)
AR(1) persistence, and (5) relative standard deviation of real exchange rates to
consumption. UL denotes the duration until the impulse response falls below the
top (maximum) point, while HL shows the duration until the impulse response
falls below half of the top point. QL denotes the duration until the impulse
response falls below a quarter of the top point. These are the measures for how
hump-shaped the impulse responses functions are. For example, if the impulse
responses are monotonically decreasing, UL and UL/HL should be zero. If the
impulse responses demonstrate persistent hump-shaped dynamics, UL/HL and
QL-HL become larger. Here, we examine three cases: (1) no loan contracts
(￿ = ￿￿ = ￿ = ￿￿ = 0); (2) ￿ exible loan contracts (’ = ’￿ = ’ = ’￿ = 0); and
(3) staggered loan contracts (’ = ’￿ = ’ = ’￿ = 0:66).
The ￿rst row in Table 4 reports the key empirical features of real exchange
rates in developed countries, which are estimated in Steinsson (2007).15
The second row reports outcomes from the model without international loan
contracts under the cost-push shock. This simulation setting is close to the
one in the ￿fth row of Table 4 examined in Steinsson (2007). We con￿rm the
￿nding in Steinsson (2007) that the cost-push shock can produce hump-shaped
dynamics in the real exchange rates.16
15HL expresses half-life (measured in years), UL/HL expresses up-life over half-life, QL-HL
expresses quarter-life minus half-life, AR(1) expresses the ￿rst order autocorrelation of the
HP-￿ltered series and Std(q)/Std(C) expresses the standard deviation of HP-￿ltered q (real
exchange rate) divided by the standard deviation of HP-￿ltered C (consumption). The point
estimates for AR(1) and Std(q)/Std(C) are calculated by simulating 1000 data series from
each model, in which each data length is 127, and the point estimate is the median value
of the resulting distribution as in Steinsson (2007). NL, FL, and SL mean no, ￿exible, and
staggered loan contracts, respectively. SP and FP mean staggered and ￿exible price settings,
respectively. PS and LRS mean price and loan interest rate shocks, respectively.
16We set di⁄erent parameters in our model, so the simulation outcomes are not exactly the
same as in Steinsson (2007).
27Table 4: Properties of the real exchange rate (persistence of shock = 0.9)
Setting HL UL/HL QL-HL AR(1) Std(q)/Std(C)
Empirical values 3.7 0.44 1.9 0.78 3.3
NL, SP, and PS 2.8 0.18 1.5 0.83 5
FL, SP, and PS 2.8 0.18 1.75 0.83 5
SL, SP, and PS 2.8 0.27 1.75 0.83 5
FL, SP, and LRS 2.8 0.18 1.75 0.83 4.6
SL, SP, and LRS 3.5 0.29 1.75 0.86 4.7
SL, FP, and LRS 3.3 0.31 1.75 0.9 4.7
The third and fourth rows show the outcomes from the model with inter-
national loan contracts under the cost-push shock.17 The third row shows the
case with ￿ exible loan contracts, while the fourth row demonstrates the case
with staggered loan contracts. Signi￿cant di⁄erences from those in the second
row can be observed. The UL/HL ratio and QL-HL increase and become closer
to the empirical values especially in the case with staggered loan contracts.
Interestingly, the degrees of staggeredness on loan contracts can change how
hump-shaped the real exchange rate dynamics are in response to the cost-push
shock. The more staggered the loan contract becomes, the more hump-shaped
the responses in the real exchange rate dynamics become. This is similar to the
recent arguments in the New Keynesian literature on the necessity of strategic
complementarity18 in marginal cost to have realistically persistent responses of
economic variables.
The ￿fth and sixth rows show outcomes from the model with international
loan contracts under the risk premium shock. Numbers in the ￿fth row are
obtained by assuming ￿ exible loan contracts while those in the sixth row are
computed by assuming staggered loan contracts. With ￿ exible loan contracts,
the simulation outcomes are similar to those obtained in the previous studies
17In these cases, the standard deviations of consumption of the home country are replaced
by that of the foreign country in calculating relative standard deviation values Std(q)/Std(C).
18The importance of strategic complementarity in price setting is ￿rst pointed out by Kim-
ball (1995).
28that stress the importance of price stickiness. The case with staggered loan con-
tracts, however, shows longer and more realistic HL, UL, and QL than others19
and demonstrates improvements in the UL/HL ratio. Contrary to the cost-
push shock examined in Steinsson (2007), the importance of the risk premium
shock on business cycle dynamics is strongly emphasized in recent empirical
studies. Thus, together with the success in replicating the persistent hump-
shaped responses, this risk premium shock should be naturally interpreted as
the candidate for the main driver of real exchange rate dynamics.
The bottom row shows outcomes from a model with staggered international
loan contracts but with ￿ exible price settings under the risk premium shock.20




￿1 b RH;t + ￿2 b R￿
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+ 2￿H (1 ￿ ￿H)qt;
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0 = (1 ￿ ￿H)
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￿ 2￿F (1 ￿ ￿F)qt:
Surprisingly, we can clearly see that stickiness of prices does not change the
hump-shaped dynamics of real exchange rates at all. This strongly implies that
the staggered price mechanism is not very important for determining real ex-
change rate dynamics, though the observed price stickiness itself is essential in
economy. In other words, only the ￿nancial market frictions and shocks can
explain the persistent hump-shaped dynamics of real exchange rates through
19As shown in Teranishi (2007), if we assume indexed changes in loan interest rates, real
exchange rate dynamics become more persistent and more volatile.
20This exercise can be compared with the case of ￿exible price and sticky wage examined
in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002) and Obstfeld (2002).
29the persistent dynamics in the marginal cost. Thus, the ￿nancial market devel-
opments can be the most important factor for the real exchange rate dynamics.
This conclusion is quite contrary to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and
Steinsson (2007), which show the necessity of the strong price stickiness for
replicating the persistent hump-shaped dynamics of real exchange rates.
4 Concluding Remarks
Empirical papers imply nontrivial roles for ￿nancial market developments through
a staggered loan contract and a risk premium shock on business cycles. We in-
troduce these factors into an otherwise standard NOEM model in a tractable
manner. Simulation results with such staggered loan contracts and risk pre-
mium shocks can generate persistent, volatile, and hump-shaped responses in
real exchange rates, which have been very di¢ cult to reproduce in standard
NOEM models. This implies that ￿nancial market developments can possibly
be a major source of persistent hump-shaped real exchange rate dynamics.
The analysis of this paper suggests several directions for future research.
First, it would be of interest to see more quantitative analysis on the roles of
staggered loan contracts and risk premium shocks on business cycles through,
say, Bayesian estimation techniques. Second, we should examine the e⁄ects
of these two factors on other aspects of the economy, such as investment and
consumption. In particular, the extension of incorporating investment whose
￿nance relies on a staggered loan contract is of great interest. In that case,
risk premium shocks may produce larger e⁄ects on business cycles than those
in our model. Finally, we would like to analyze the property of optimal pol-
icy coordination in the presence of staggered loan contracts and risk premium
shocks.
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